Armed conflicts generate substantial greenhouse gas emissions across three scopes under the GHG Protocol framework:
- Scope 1: Direct emissions from military operations (fuel combustion in aircraft, ships, tanks, and vehicles).
- Scope 2: Indirect emissions from purchased electricity and heat used by military bases and facilities.
- Scope 3: All other indirect emissions, most significantly those embedded in the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, supply-chain activities, and long-term displacement effects.
The ongoing escalation involving Iran in 2026 has already produced significant emissions through airstrikes, missile exchanges, naval movements, and ground operations.
However, the largest long-term climate burden will arise from reconstruction, following patterns observed in previous high-intensity conflicts.
Using Gaza 2023–2025 as the most recent comparable case (estimated total emissions of 33.2 million tonnes of CO₂e, of which over 31 million tonnes stem from rebuilding), the emerging Iran conflict is likely to generate emissions on a materially larger scale due to the size of the economy, energy infrastructure, and urban centres affected.
Emissions Comparison and Scale
Preliminary estimates place direct military emissions from the first six weeks of intensified operations in the range of 1.8–3.2 million tonnes CO₂e. This figure is derived from:
- Jet fuel consumption by strike aircraft and refuelling tankers.
- Missile propellant combustion.
- Naval vessel bunker fuel usage in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
- Ground vehicle diesel consumption during border and internal security operations.
When Scope 3 reconstruction emissions are included, the total burden rises dramatically. The Gaza precedent provides a benchmark:
- Gaza reconstruction emissions (projected 2025–2035) ≈ 31 million tonnes CO₂e
- Equivalent to the annual CO₂ emissions of Jordan (≈ 28–30 Mt CO₂e/year) or Slovenia.
The Iran conflict involves:
- A national economy roughly 30–40× larger than Gaza’s pre-conflict GDP.
- Extensive damage to oil & gas infrastructure (refineries, gas processing plants, and export terminals).
- Large-scale destruction in urban and industrial zones.
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Conservative projections suggest total conflict + reconstruction emissions could reach 80–150 million tonnes CO₂e over the next decade, equivalent to the annual emissions of a mid-sized developed economy (e.g., Portugal or Greece).
New and Amplified Risks
The 2026 Middle East conflict introduces several emission multipliers not as prominent in previous Middle East conflicts:
- Refinery and petrochemical fires: Strikes on Abadan, Bandar Abbas, Assaluyeh, and other facilities have caused prolonged burning of hydrocarbons. Each major refinery fire can release 0.5–2 million tonnes of CO₂e before being controlled.
- Flaring from damaged gas infrastructure: Uncontrolled release and emergency flaring of associated gas significantly increase methane and CO₂ emissions.
- Supply-chain emissions from reconstruction materials: Cement, steel, and aluminium production (key reconstruction inputs) are highly carbon-intensive. Rebuilding damaged port, refinery, and power infrastructure will require millions of tonnes of these materials.
- Long-duration displacement emissions: Large-scale internal displacement increases reliance on diesel generators and liquid fuels for heating/cooking, adding to Scope 3 emissions.
These factors make the climate footprint of the conflict materially higher per unit of physical destruction compared with earlier conflicts in less industrialised settings.
Call to Action: Mandatory Military Emissions Reporting
The scale and long-tail nature of conflict-related emissions highlight a critical governance gap: military emissions remain almost entirely excluded from national greenhouse gas inventories and international climate reporting obligations.
Existing frameworks (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement) allow countries to report military emissions under “bunker fuels” (aviation and marine) but do not require comprehensive disclosure of domestic military operations or reconstruction impacts.
This exclusion obscures hundreds of millions of tonnes of CO₂e annually across global conflicts.
A meaningful step forward would be mandatory, standardised military emissions reporting under the UNFCCC, including:
- Scope 1 and 2 emissions from all military activities.
- Scope 3 emissions from major reconstruction contracts awarded by belligerent states.
- Third-party verification of reported figures.
Until such transparency is established, the full climate cost of conflicts including the 2026 Iran war will remain largely hidden from global carbon accounting and climate policy.
Future Outlook
The 2026 Middle East conflict is generating a substantial but under-reported carbon burden. While direct military emissions already reach millions of tonnes, the reconstruction phase is likely to dominate the total footprint, potentially exceeding 80–150 million tonnes of CO₂e over the next decade.
This scale underscores the urgent need for mandatory military emissions reporting and greater integration of conflict-related emissions into national and global climate strategies.
Until these changes occur, the long-term climate consequences of geopolitical crises will continue to be systematically underestimated.
Ronnie Paul is a seasoned writer and analyst with a prolific portfolio of over 1,000 published articles, specialising in fintech, cryptocurrency, climate change, and digital finance at Africa Digest News.
